We present ABA + , a new approach to handling preferences in a well known structured argumentation formalism, Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA). In ABA + , preference information given over assumptions is incorporated directly into the attack relation, thus resulting in attack reversal. ABA + conservatively extends ABA and exhibits various desirable features regarding relationship among argumentation semantics as well as preference handling. We also introduce Weak Contraposition, a principle concerning reasoning with rules and preferences that relaxes the standard principle of contraposition, while guaranteeing additional desirable features for ABA + .
Introduction
Argumentation (as overviewed in e.g. [51] ) is a branch of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning that, among other goals, aims to formalise reasoning with conflicting and uncertain information. In argumentation, knowledge is often (e.g. in [30] ) represented via arguments and conflicts are captured via attacks among arguments, and reasoning amounts to selecting sets of collectively acceptable arguments, called extensions, where acceptability conditions are dependent on the semantics chosen (see e.g. [10, 7] for overviews of argumentation semantics).
It has been shown that argumentation is a perspicuous abstraction method capturing several existing reasoning paradigms, particularly non-monotonic reasoning and logic programming (see e.g. [30, 15, 38] ), as well as forms of decision making (see e.g. [2] ), to name a few. Consequently, argumentation can be seen as a significant approach to common-sense reasoning.
formalisms of argumentation with preferences. We conclude in section 8.
The precursor to this research is the recently published short paper [26] , where we presented the main idea and basics of ABA + . With respect to that work, in section 3 we extend ABA + to non-flat frameworks and define new semantics (ideal). Sections 4.2 and 4.3 are new, whereas section 4.4 significantly expands its precursor subsection 'Rationality Postulates' in [26] with new results (starting from Principle 5) . The rest of the paper, i.e. sections 5, 6 and 7, consists of new material.
Background
We base the following ABA background on [15, 59] . An ABA framework is a tuple (L, R, A,¯¯), where:
• (L, R) is a deductive system with L a language (a set of sentences) and R a set of rules of the form ϕ 0 ← ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m with m 0 and ϕ i ∈ L for i ∈ {0, . . . , m};
-ϕ 0 is referred to as the head of the rule, and -ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m is referred to as the body of the rule;
-if m = 0, then the rule ϕ 0 ← ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m is said to have an empty body, and is written as ϕ 0 ← ⊤, where ⊤ ∈ L; • A ⊆ L is a non-empty set, whose elements are referred to as assumptions;
•¯¯: A → L is a total map: for α ∈ A, the L-sentence α is referred to as the contrary of α.
In the remainder of this section, unless specified differently, we assume as given a fixed but otherwise arbitrary ABA framework (L, R, A,¯¯).
A deduction for ϕ ∈ L supported by S ⊆ L and R ⊆ R, denoted by S ⊢ R ϕ, is a finite tree with • the root labelled by ϕ, • leaves labelled by ⊤ or elements from S,
• the children of non-leaf nodes ψ labelled by the elements of the body of some rule from R with head ψ, and R being the set of all such rules.
For E ⊆ L, the conclusions Cn(E) of E is the set of sentences for which deductions supported by subsets of E exist, i.e.
Cn(E) = {ϕ ∈ L : ∃ S ⊢ R ϕ, S ⊆ E, R ⊆ R}.
Semantics of ABA frameworks are defined in terms of sets of assumptions meeting desirable requirements. One such requirement is being closed under deduction, defined as follows. For
The remaining desirable requirements met by sets of assumptions, as semantics for ABA frameworks, are given in terms of a notion of attack between sets of assumptions, defined as follows. A set A ⊆ A of assumptions attacks a set B ⊆ A of assumptions, denoted A B, 1 iff there is a deduction A ′ ⊢ R β, for some β ∈ B, supported by some A ′ ⊆ A and R ⊆ R. If it is not the case that A attacks B, then we may write A B. (We will adopt an analogous convention for other attack relations throughout the paper.)
To define ABA semantics, we use the following auxiliary notions. For E ⊆ A:
• E is conflict-free iff E E; • E defends A ⊆ A iff for all closed B ⊆ A with B
A it holds that E B.
2
ABA semantics are as follows. A set E ⊆ A of assumptions (also called an extension) is:
• admissible iff E is closed, conflict-free and defends itself;
• preferred iff E is ⊆-maximally admissible;
• complete iff E is admissible and contains every set of assumptions it defends;
• stable iff E is closed and E {β} for every β ∈ A \ E; • well-founded iff E is the intersection of all complete extensions;
• ideal iff E is ⊆-maximal among sets of assumptions that are -admissible, and -contained in all preferred extensions. Note that ideal sets of assumptions were originally defined by [35] in the context of flat ABA frameworks only. The original definition naturally generalises to any, possibly non-flat, ABA frameworks as given above. Note also that, in the case of flat ABA frameworks, the term grounded is conventionally used instead of well-founded (e.g. in [35] ): we will adopt this convention too later in the paper.
We illustrate various ABA concepts with a formalisation of the Referendum example from the Introduction.
Example 3 (Example 1 as a flat ABA framework). The information given in Example 1 can 1 We use the symbol instead of the commonly used → to denote attacks in order to avoid confusion, when → (or ← in the case of ABA) is used to denote rules in structured argumentation, e.g. ASPIC + (see section 7). 2 Defence in ABA can be equivalently defined 'pointwise', i.e. E defends A ⊆ A iff for all α ∈ A, for all closed B ⊆ A with B {α} it holds that E B. Imperial College London K.Čyras and F. Toni ABA + be represented as an ABA framework F Z = (L, R, A,¯¯) with • language L = {α, β, leave, stay},
• set of rules R = {leave ← α, stay ← β},
• set of assumptions A = {α, β},
• contraries given by: α = stay, β = leave.
Here α and β stand for the possibility to trust Ann and Bob, respectively, and rules leave ← α and stay ← β represent the statements of Zed's interlocutors. Note that F Z is flat. In F Z , we find that {α} and {β} attack each other, and both of them attack and are attacked by {α, β}, which also attacks itself. F Z can be graphically represented as follows (in illustrations of ABA frameworks, nodes hold sets of assumptions while directed edges indicate attacks):
F Z has two preferred and stable extensions {α} and {β}, with conclusions Cn({α}) = {α, leave} and Cn({β}) = {β, stay}, respectively. F Z has a unique grounded (well-founded) and ideal extension ∅, with conclusions Cn(∅) = ∅. Furthermore, all of {α}, {β} and ∅ are admissible and complete extensions.
Similarly, the extended Referendum example can be represented in ABA, but via a non-flat ABA framework, as follows.
Example 4 (Example 2 as a non-flat ABA framework). The situation where Dan joins the conversation can be represented by a non-flat ABA framework F D , which is F Z from Example 3 extended with an additional rule β ← δ and an additional assumption δ (standing for trust in Dan). Overall, F D has
• L = {α, β, δ, leave, stay, δ},
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• R = {leave ← α, stay ← β, β ← δ}, • A = {α, β, δ},
• α = stay, β = leave.
In F D , if a set of assumptions contains δ, then it is closed only if it also contains β. Thus, the only admissible extensions of F D are ∅, {α}, {β} and {β, δ}. Also, {β, δ} is a unique stable extension of F D , whereas both {α} and {β, δ} are preferred. ∅ is thus a unique well-founded and ideal extension of F D , and only {β, δ} is complete.
ABA
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We also recall, from [30] , that an AA framework is a pair (Args, ) with a set Args of arguments and a binary attack relation on Args. A set E ⊆ Args of arguments attacks an argument B ∈ Args, written E B in this paper, iff there is A ∈ E with A B; also, E attacks a set E ′ ⊆ Args of arguments, written E E ′ in this paper, iff there is B ∈ E ′ with E B. Then a set E ⊆ Args is conflict-free iff E E; also, E defends A ∈ Args iff for all B A we find E B. Definition of semantics in terms (grounded, ideal, stable, preferred, complete, admissible) extensions of AA frameworks is the same as for (flat) ABA frameworks but with 'assumptions' replaced by 'arguments' (and the closure condition dropped).
ABA
+
We extend ABA frameworks (L, R, A,¯¯) with a preference ordering on the set A of assumptions to obtain ABA + frameworks (L, R, A,¯¯, ), as follows.
, where (L, R, A,¯¯) is an ABA framework and is a transitive binary relation on A.
We henceforth apply the notions of conclusions, closure and flatness to ABA + frameworks, having in mind their underlying ABA frameworks. The strict counterpart < of is defined as α < β iff α β and β α, for any α and β. 4 The Referendum example can be used to illustrate the concept of an ABA + framework thus.
Example 5 (Example 1 as a flat ABA + framework). Recall the ABA framework F Z from Example 3 representing Zed's knowledge. From Example 1, we know that Zed trusts Bob more than Ann. Hence, we may form a preference over Zed's assumptions, namely α < β. So we obtain an ABA + framework F + Z = (L, R, A,¯¯, ) with • the underlying ABA framework F Z (from Example 3) and • the preference ordering over A given by α < β.
Differently from some other structured argumentation approaches, such as for example ASPIC + [47] or DeLP [39] , we consider preferences on assumptions rather than (defeasible)
rules. This is not, however, a conceptual difference, since assumptions are the only defeasible component in ABA and ABA + . Also note that, similarly to the approach in [32] , may or may not be a preorder (a reflexive and transitive binary relation), i.e. we do not require reflexivity.
From now on, unless stated differently, we consider a fixed but otherwise arbitrary ABA + framework (L, R, A,¯¯, ), and implicitly assume (L, R, A,¯¯) to be its underlying ABA framework.
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We next define the attack relation in ABA + . The idea is that when the attacker has an assumption less preferred than the one attacked, then the attack is reversed.
Definition 2.
A ⊆ A <-attacks B ⊆ A, denoted A < B, just in case:
• either there is a deduction A ′ ⊢ R β, for some β ∈ B, supported by A ′ ⊆ A, and ∄α ′ ∈ A ′ with α ′ < β;
• or there is a deduction B ′ ⊢ R α, for some α ∈ A, supported by B ′ ⊆ B, and ∃β ′ ∈ B ′ with β ′ < α.
We call an <-attack formed as in the first bullet point above a normal attack, 5 and an <-attack formed as in the second bullet point above a reverse attack.
Intuitively, A < B as a normal attack if A B and no assumption of A used in this attack is strictly less preferred than the attacked assumption (from B). Otherwise, B < A as a reverse attack if A B and this attack depends on at least one assumption that is strictly less preferred than the attacked one. , {α} 'tries' to attack {β}, but is prevented by the preference α < β. Instead, {β} <-attacks {α} (and also {α, β}) via reverse attack. Likewise, {α, β} <-attacks both itself and {α} via reverse attack. F + Z can be represented graphically as follows (here and later, double-tipped arrows denote attacks that are both normal and reverse):
In contrast with the ABA framework F Z , where {α} defends against is attackers, in the ABA + framework F + Z , {α} is <-attacked by, in particular, {β}, but does not <-attack it back. This concords with the intended meaning of the preference α < β, that the conflict should be resolved in favour of β. This concept of <-attack reflects the interplay between deductions, contraries and preferences, by representing inherent conflicts among sets of assumptions while accounting for preference information. Normal attacks follow the standard notion of attack in ABA, additionally preventing the attack to succeed when the attacker uses assumptions less preferred than the one attacked. Reverse attacks, meanwhile, resolve the conflict between two sets of assumptions by favouring the one containing an assumption whose contrary is deduced, over the one which uses less preferred assumptions to deduce that contrary.
We next define the notions of conflict-freeness and defence with respect to < , and then introduce ABA + semantics.
• E <-defends A ⊆ A if for all closed B ⊆ A with B < A it holds that E < B.
ABA + semantics can be defined by replacing, in the standard ABA semantics definition, the notions of attack and defence with those of <-attack and <-defence, as follows.
Definition 4.
A set E ⊆ A of assumptions (also called an extension) is:
• <-admissible if E closed, <-conflict-free and <-defends itself;
• <-preferred if E is ⊆-maximally <-admissible;
• <-complete if E is <-admissible and contains every set of assumptions it <-defends;
• <-stable, if E is closed, <-conflict-free and E < {β} for every β ∈ A \ E;
• <-well-founded if E is the intersection of all <-complete extensions;
• <-ideal if E is ⊆-maximal among sets of assumptions that are -<-admissible, and -contained in all preferred <-extensions.
Note: similarly to the convention in ABA, in the case of flat ABA + frameworks we may use the term <-grounded instead of <-well-founded.
The following examples illustrate ABA + semantics.
Example 7 (Extensions of the flat ABA + framework representing Example 1). The flat ABA + framework F + Z from Example 6 has <-admissible extensions ∅ and {β}. In particular, {α} is not <-admissible in F + Z because it does not <-defend against, for instance, {β}. Also, {α, β} is not <-admissible, because not <-conflict-free. Hence, F + Z has a unique <-complete, <-preferred, <-stable, <-ideal and <-grounded extension {β}, with conclusions Cn({β}) = {β, stay}.
Example 8 (Example 2 as a non-flat ABA
+ framework and extensions thereof). Taking the non-flat ABA framework F D = (L, R, A,¯¯) from Example 4 and equipping it with preference information α < β yields a non-flat ABA + framework F + D = (L, R, A,¯¯, ) which has a unique <-complete, <-preferred, <-stable, <-ideal and <-well-founded extension {β, δ} with conclusions Cn({β, δ}) = {β, δ, stay}.
Let us consider a slightly more complex setting, by way of building on our Referendum example. Example 3, but with the additional assumption γ standing for the possibility of the referendum, and the rules leave ← α, γ and stay ← β, γ instead. Overall, Carl's ABA + framework is
• α < β, α < γ.
Note that F + C is flat. It can be represented graphically thus (for readability, we omit the assumption sets ∅ and {α, β, γ}, as well as <-attacks to and from them; also, here and later, normal attacks are denoted by solid arrows and reverse attacks are denoted by dotted arrows; as before, double-tipped arrows denote attacks that are both normal and reverse): The set {α, γ} (deducing the contrary leave of β) is prevented from <-attacking {β}, and instead {β}, as well as any set containing β, <-attacks {α, γ} via reverse attack. Also, {β, γ} <-attacks {α}, as well as any set containing α, via normal attack, because no assumption in {β, γ} is less preferred than α.
The framework F + C has a unique <-complete, <-preferred, <-stable, <-ideal and <-grounded extension, namely {β, γ}, with conclusions Cn({β, γ}) = {β, γ, stay}, arguably a desirable outcome. Imperial College London K.Čyras and F. Toni ABA + Henceforth, we focus on σ ∈ {well-founded/grounded, ideal, stable, preferred, complete} and use σ and <-σ to refer to ABA and ABA + semantics, respectively.
We conclude this section with the observations that attacks in ABA can be viewed as <-attacks in ABA + when preferences are absent (Lemma 1), and thus that ABA + is a conservative extension of ABA (Theorem 2). Proof. Immediate from the definitions of attack in ABA, and <-attack in ABA + , when is empty.
Proof. Immediate from definitions of ABA and ABA + semantics, and Lemma 1.
Having provided and illustrated the basics of ABA + , we move on to studying ABA + in depth. In general, argumentation formalisms can be measured against certain principles, such as those regarding relationship among semantics (see e.g. [30, 15, 9] ), preference handling (see e.g. [41, 3, 19, 4] ), rationality (see e.g. [21, 46] ) and other features of argumentation frameworks (see e.g. [32, 11, 31] 
Basic Properties
We begin with several basic properties that ABA + exhibits. First, the attack relation in ABA + is monotonic with respect to set inclusion, like in ABA, as indicated next.
Proof. Immediate from the definition of < . Imperial College London Proof. Let A, B ⊆ A be arbitrary.
• Suppose first A B. Then ∃A ′ ⊢ R β such that β ∈ B, A ′ ⊆ A, and
In case (i), A ′ < B, and hence A < B, by Lemma 3. In case (ii), {β} < A ′ , and hence B < A, by Lemma 3 as well.
• Suppose now A < B. Then
In case (i), A ′ {β}, and so A B, whereas in case (ii), B ′ {α}, so that B A, using Lemma 3 in both cases.
As an immediate corollary, conflict is preserved across ABA and ABA + in the following sense:
We will use this result to establish other desirable properties of ABA + frameworks, for instance in sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.
Relationship Among Semantics
In terms of relationship among semantics, generic ABA + frameworks exhibit several features exhibited also by generic ABA frameworks. We summarise and prove them next. (From now on, proofs omitted in the main body of the paper can be found in Appendix A).
(ii) If E is <-stable, then it is <-preferred.
(iii) If E is <-stable, then it is <-complete.
(iv) If E is <-well-founded, then for every <-stable extension E ′ it holds that E ⊆ E ′ .
(v) If E is the intersection of all the <-preferred extensions and E is also <-admissible, then E is <-ideal. Imperial College London K.Čyras and F. Toni ABA + (vi) If E is <-ideal, then it is not <-attacked by any <-admissible set of assumptions.
(vii) If the empty set ∅ is closed, then there is a <-preferred extension, as well as an <-ideal extension.
Preference Handling Principles
We now consider several desirable properties (proposed in [6, 3, 19, 53] ) of argumentation formalisms dealing with preferences and their satisfaction in ABA + . Originally, these properties were defined in the context of AA with preferences and/or Logic Programming with preferences.
In all sections we appropriately reformulate these properties as principles for ABA + . (Recall that, unless stated otherwise, (L, R, A,¯¯, ) is assumed to be a fixed but otherwise arbitrary ABA + framework.)
Conflict Preservation
The first property, proposed by [3] and [19] , insists that extensions returned after accounting for preferences should be conflict-free with respect to the attack relation not taking into account preferences. We formulate it as a principle applicable to ABA + as follows.
Principle 1. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Conflict Preservation
for <-σ semantics just in case for all <-σ extensions E ⊆ A of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), for any α, β ∈ A, {α} {β} implies that either α ∈ E or β ∈ E (or both).
Conflict preservation is guaranteed in ABA + directly from Theorem 5:
Proposition 7. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Conflict Preservation for any semantics <-σ.
Proof. Let E be a <-σ extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ). Let α, β ∈ A be such that {α} {β}.
Then {α, β} is not conflict-free, and hence not <-conflict-free, by Theorem 5. If α, β ∈ E, then E is not <-conflict-free either, which is a contradiction. Thus, {α, β} E, as required.
Empty Preferences
The second property, taken from [3, 19] (adapted also from the literature on Logic Programming with Preferences, see e.g. [53] for a discussion), insists that if there are no preferences, then the extensions returned using a preference handling mechanism should be the same as those obtained without accounting for preferences. We formulate it as a principle applicable to ABA + as follows.
Principle 2. (L, R, A,¯¯, ∅) fulfils the Principle of Empty Preferences for
This principle is guaranteed in ABA + , given that it is a conservative extension of ABA Proof. Immediate from Theorem 2.
Maximal Elements
The next property, proposed by [6] in the context of AA with preferences, concerns inclusion in extensions of the 'strongest' arguments, i.e. arguments that are maximal with respect to the preference ordering. We next reformulate the property to be applicable to ABA + .
Principle 3. Suppose that the preference ordering of (L, R, A,¯¯, ) is total and further assume that the set M = {α ∈ A : ∄β ∈ A with α < β} is closed and <-conflict-free.
(L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-σ semantics just in case for
For an illustration, consider F + Z from Example 5. β is a unique -maximal element in A, and {β} is a unique <-σ extension of F + Z for any σ (see Example 7), whence F + Z fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for any semantics <-σ.
Our next result shows that, in general, this principle is guaranteed in ABA + for <-wellfounded, <-stable and <-complete semantics.
Proposition 9. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-complete, <-stable and <-well-founded semantics.
Under <-preferred and <-ideal semantics the Principle of Maximal Elements can in general be violated, as illustrated next. Note that β and γ are -maximal, {β, γ} is closed and <-conflict-free, and yet (L, R, A,¯¯, ) admits a <-preferred extension {α, β}, as well as an <-ideal extension {β}, none of which contains {β, γ}.
In section 6 we will give sufficient conditions for ABA + frameworks to fulfil the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-preferred and <-ideal semantics too.
Rationality Postulates
Rationality postulates proposed by [21] can be applied to argumentation formalisms. They are well studied in, for instance, ASPIC + , where several conditions needed to satisfy the principles are established (see e.g. [46] ). Rationality postulates have not been studied in ABA in general (but see [56] for an analysis with respect to a version of ABA, and [46] for an analysis of a restricted form of flat ABA). We now study these postulates in ABA + in general. In particular,
following [46] , we provide their precise formulations for ABA + in general, as well as for a restricted class of ABA + frameworks incorporating classical negation. We also establish the satisfaction of the postulates in general, and delineate conditions under which ABA + satisfies the postulates for the restricted class of frameworks. We define the postulates using the following auxiliary definitions.
Definition 5. S ⊆ L is:
• directly consistent if there are no ϕ, ψ ∈ S with ϕ = ψ;
• indirectly consistent if Cn(S) is directly consistent.
Theorem 5 implies that <-conflict-free sets are (in)directly consistent.
Lemma 10. Any closed and <-conflict-free set E ⊆ A is both directly and indirectly consistent.
. As E is <-conflict-free, it is conflict-free, by Theorem 5. Suppose for a contradiction that E is not directly consistent. Then there are α, β ∈ E such that α = β. But as {α} ⊢ ∅ α is a deduction supported by {α} ⊆ E, we get E E, contradicting conflict-freeness of E. Likewise, suppose E is not indirectly consistent. Then there are ϕ, β ∈ Cn(E) such that ϕ = β, and as E is closed, β ∈ E. But then there is a deduction Φ ⊢ R ϕ supported by some Φ ⊆ E, so that E E, which is a contradiction.
We next formulate the rationality postulates for ABA + .
Satisfaction of these principles is guaranteed in ABA + , as shown next.
Theorem 11. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the principles of Closure, Consistency and Indirect Consistency, for any semantics <-σ.
Proof. Satisfaction of the Principle of Closure is immediate from the definition of the conclusions operator Cn (Definition 2), and fulfilment of the principles of Direct and Indirect Consistency follows from Lemma 10.
We note that [21] originally intended the postulates to account for classical negation. Classical negation is not, however, singled-out in [46] 's formulations of the postulates. Nevertheless, the original intentions can be accounted for by appropriately formulating the principle of 'classical consistency' for ABA + , and by formally describing what is required of ABA + frameworks to fulfil this principle. We do this next, following [21, 46] . For the remainder of this section, we assume the language L to be closed under the classical negation operator ¬. As a shorthand, the complement −ϕ of ϕ ∈ L is: ¬ψ if ϕ = ψ; and ψ if ϕ = ¬ψ.
Principle 5. Let E 1 , . . . , E n be all the <-σ extensions of (L, R, A,¯¯, ). Then (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Classical Consistency for <-σ semantics just in case for no ϕ ∈ L it holds that both ϕ ∈ Cn(E i ) and −ϕ ∈ Cn(E i ), for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Obviously, if the rules of an ABA + framework include a sentence and its negation as rules with empty bodies, then the Principle of Classical Consistency is violated, as illustrated below. 7 The idea of this principle is that conclusions of extensions should be deductively closed with respect to the deductive system (L, R), and, in the case of ABA + , the conclusions operator Cn is the deductive closure operator; in ASPIC + the operator of closure under strict rules is used instead, see [46] for details. Imperial College London K.Čyras and F. Toni
Then ∅ ⊢ {p←⊤} p and ∅ ⊢ {¬p←⊤} ¬p, and so ∅ is a unique <-admissible extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), and has Cn(∅) = {p, ¬p}. Thus, ∅ is unique <-σ extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, )
for any σ, and therefore, this ABA + framework violates the Principle of Classical Consistency.
To avoid such situations, we can impose a restriction-akin to the property of axiom consistency from [46] -on ABA + frameworks, as follows.
Clearly, (L, R, A,¯¯, ) from Example 11 does not satisfy the Axiom of Consistency. We now propose a property of ABA + frameworks whose satisfaction, together with the Axiom of Consistency, leads to fulfilment of the Principle of Classical Consistency.
Axiom 2. (L, R, A,¯¯, ) satisfies the Axiom of Negation just in case for all A ⊆ A, R ⊆ R and ϕ ∈ L it holds that if A ⊢ R ϕ and A = ∅, then for some α ∈ A it holds that α = −ϕ.
The axiom of Negation essentially requires that if an assumption can be used to derive a sentence, then the negation of that sentence should be the contrary of that assumption. Note that this axiom is somewhat restrictive in that it forces the contrary of some assumption to be a particular sentence. However, this syntactic restriction is not a semantic restriction, because if another sentence, say ψ, is wanted as the contrary of α, then rules −ϕ ← ψ and ψ ← −ϕ can be added to the framework. Another possibility would be to have a more general contrary mapping¯¯: A → ℘(L) which assigns a set of contraries to each assumption, just like in some formulations of ABA (see e.g. [59, 37] ) equivalent to the standard presentation we adopt in this paper. Alternative formulations of the Axiom of Negation are beyond the scope of this paper, and are left as future work.
Satisfaction of the axioms of Consistency and Negation guarantees fulfilment of the Principle of Classical Consistency, as our next result shows. Proof. Fix σ and let E be a <-σ extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ). Suppose for a contradiction that for some ϕ ∈ L we have ϕ, −ϕ ∈ Cn(E). Then, by the Axiom of Consistency, there must be deductions A ⊢ R ϕ and B ⊢ R ′ −ϕ with at least one of A, B ⊆ E non-empty. Say A = ∅. Imperial College London K.Čyras and F. Toni ABA + Thus, by the Axiom of Negation, we have α = −ϕ, for some α ∈ A. Thus, A ∪ B, and as a consequence E, is not conflict-free, and hence not <-conflict-free (by Theorem 5). This is a contradiction. Therefore, for no ϕ ∈ L we have ϕ, −ϕ ∈ Cn(E). Thus, as σ was arbitrary, (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Classical Consistency for any semantics <-σ.
This result shows, given the class of ABA + frameworks with classical negation in the language, how to satisfy classical consistency. In particular, it suffices to ensure that the nondefeasible part of the ABA + framework is consistent (the Axiom of Consistency), and to accordingly incorporate the negation into the contrary mapping. (Such an approach was also pursued by [56] .) Note, however, that this is a different approach than the one indirectly proposed by [46] for flat ABA frameworks as instances of ASPIC + , where, in particular, contraposition on rules was suggested (consult section 5 and Appendix B). The conditions that we identify are different from those proposed in [46] , because ASPIC + employs a contrariness function (consult Appendix B) which is different from the contrary mapping in ABA/ABA + .
In this section we saw that non-flat ABA + frameworks exhibit various desirable properties proposed in the literature. It is known that flat ABA frameworks exhibit additional properties in terms of relationship among semantics [15, 35] . ASPIC + too adheres to various principles, such as rationality postulates, whenever contraposition on rules is imposed. 8 In the next section, we propose a relaxed version of contraposition, called Weak Contraposition, and in section 6 show that, subject to Weak Contraposition, flat ABA + frameworks exhibit additional desirable properties too.
Weak Contraposition
We have shown (Proposition 7) that conflict preservation is always guaranteed in ABA + . In order to ensure conflict preservation in other approaches, notably ASPIC + , contraposition can be utilised, as illustrated next. that {A, B, B ′ } is undefeated, yet self-attacking. 8 Equivalently, transposition, as proposed by [21] , can be used; we focus on contraposition in this paper. 9 Consult Appendix B and e.g. [47, 46] for details on ASPIC + . For our purposes here these details are unnecessary. As a result, the desirable {A, A ′ } is obtained as a unique acceptable extension if contraposition is imposed.
Formally, the principle of contraposition can be expressed in ABA + as follows. This axiom requires that if an assumption plays a role in deducing the contrary of another assumption, then it should be possible for the latter to contribute to a deduction of the contrary of the former assumption too.
In ABA + , the Axiom of Contraposition is not required to guarantee conflict preservation (as sanctioned by Proposition 7), but restrictions on ABA + frameworks may be needed to ensure other properties, such as existence of <-complete extensions, which need not be guaranteed in general: the ABA + framework from Example 10 has no <-complete extension, because all the singletons {α}, {β} and {γ} are <-unattacked, but {α, β, γ} is not <-conflict-free. We will prove (in section 6) that a relaxed version of contraposition, formulated below, suffices to guarantee desirable properties, such as, in particular, the so-called Fundamental Lemma (see e.g. [30, Lemma 10] , [15, Theorem 5.7] ) and all the properties that follow from it, such as existence of <-complete extensions. In essence, satisfaction of the Axiom of Weak Contraposition ensures that, given a ⊆-minimally non-<-conflict-free set S of assumptions, some least preferred (i.e. -minimal) assumption α ∈ S is <-attacked (via normal attack) by the rest of the set (i.e. S \ {α}). Thus, the Axiom of Weak Contraposition has a similar effect as the inconsistency resolving property recently proposed by [31, Definition 8] . However, the latter does not take preferences into account. Formal correspondence between the Axiom of Weak Contraposition and Dung's inconsistency resolving property is a line of future work.
Note also that any ABA + framework (L, R, A,¯¯, ∅) (i.e. when preference information is absent) automatically satisfies the Axiom of Weak Contraposition, without forcing any new rules. This is a welcome feature, because, as discussed in [11] , standard contraposition together with general contrariness mappings, notably the one in ASPIC + , may lead to certain unintended behaviours when preferences are not present.
In the next section we show that the Axiom of Weak Contraposition allows flat ABA + frameworks to retain the relationships among semantics known to hold among semantics of flat ABA frameworks, which then allows to extend Proposition 9 to the rest of semantics considered in this paper. Lemma 13 (Fundamental Lemma). Let S ⊆ A be <-admissible and assume that S <-defends {α}, {α ′ } ⊆ A. Then S ∪ {α} is <-admissible and <-defends {α ′ }. <-admissible and <-defends {α} (because {α} is <-unattacked), but {α, β, γ} is not <-conflictfree and thus not <-admissible.
Lemma 13 implies that, subject to Weak Contraposition, the following additional properties of ABA + semantics hold for flat ABA + frameworks, mirroring the properties held by flat ABA (as well as AA) frameworks.
(ii) Every <-preferred extension of F is <-complete.
(iii) F has a <-complete extension.
(iv) F has a unique <-grounded extension, which is moreover <-complete.
(v) F has a unique <-ideal extension, which is moreover <-complete.
Observe that if an ABA + framework is non-flat, satisfaction of the Axiom of Weak Contraposition does not guarantee the properties above, since ABA + conservatively extends ABA (Theorem 2) and these properties can be falsified for non-flat ABA frameworks [15] .
Theorem 14 implies that flat ABA + frameworks satisfying Weak Contraposition fulfil the Principle of Maximal Elements not only for <-complete, <-stable and <-well-founded semantics (Proposition 9), but also for <-preferred and <-ideal semantics:
Corollary 15. If (L, R, A,¯¯, ) is flat and satisfies the Axiom of Weak Contraposition, then it fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-preferred and <-ideal semantics.
Proof. By Theorem 14(ii, v), <-preferred and <-ideal extensions are <-complete for (L, R, A,¯¯, ) flat and satisfying the Axiom of Weak Contraposition. The claim thus follows from Proposition 9.
Investigating whether the class of flat ABA + frameworks satisfying the Axiom of Weak Contraposition is the smallest class for which the results (Lemma 13, Theorem 14, Corollary 15) established in this section hold is left for future work.
Comparison
In this section we compare ABA + to formalisms of argumentation with preferences most relevant to ABA + . In particular, we focus on: PAFs [6, 4, 5] 
PAFs
A Preference-based Argumentation Framework (PAF) (Args, , ) consists of an AA framework (Args, ) equipped with a (partial) preorder over arguments, which is used to generate a defeat relation, denoted by ֒→ in this paper, by reversing attacks from less preferred arguments. Formally, given a PAF (Args, , ), the repaired framework [6] is an AA framework (Args, ֒→), where A ֒→ B iff either A B and A ⊀ B, or B A and B ≺ A. A set E ⊆ Args is a σ extension of (Args, , ) iff it is a σ extension of (Args, ֒→). Note that the ABA + framework corresponding to (Args, , ) is always flat.
Trivially, attacks in a given PAF are in a one-to-one correspondence with <-attacks in the corresponding ABA + framework, as follows:
Proof. A ֒→ B ⇔ (i) either A B and A < B (ii) or B A and B < A ⇔ (i) either ∃ B ← A ∈ R and A < B (ii) or ∃ A ← B ∈ R and B < A ⇔ {A} < {B}.
From the construction of the ABA + framework corresponding to (Args, , ) and Lemma 16, we obtain the following correspondence result, which says that, under any semantics σ, every PAF is an instance of ABA + . Imperial College London K.Čyras and F. Toni ABA + Theorem 17. Let (L, R, A,¯¯, ) be the corresponding ABA + framework to (Args, , ). Then E is a σ extension of (Args, , ) iff E is a <-σ extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ).
Thus, ABA + can be seen to generalise PAFs, similarly to how ABA generalises AA [57] .
It is known that flat ABA frameworks are instances of AA frameworks [35] , choosing arguments of the form A : A ⊢ ϕ (where A ⊢ ϕ means there is a deduction A ⊢ R ϕ for some R ⊆ R) and attacks A B, for arguments A : A ⊢ ϕ and B : B ⊢ ψ, whenever ϕ = β for some β ∈ B. Let us see whether flat ABA + frameworks are similarly instances of PAFs. In order to do this, given a preference relation on A, we can try to define an ordering over arguments. For example, we can utilise the following orderings taken from [46, 61] :
• A ≺ Eli B if ∃α ∈ A such that ∀β ∈ B we find α < β;
• A ≺ DEli B if ∃α ∈ A \ B such that ∀β ∈ B \ A we find α < β;
• A Dem B if ∀α ∈ A we find β ∈ B with α β;
The three comparison principles Eli, Dem and DEli are referred to as Elitist, Democratic and Disjoint Elitist [61] , respectively. The following example shows that, whichever argument ordering above is used, the original flat ABA + frameworks and the resulting PAFs are not semantically equivalent.
Example 13. Consider the ABA + framework (L, R, A,¯¯, ) with:
This ABA + framework is flat and satisfies the Axiom of Weak Contraposition. Its sets of assumptions that support deductions, together with <-attacks among them, can be depicted graphically as follows (highlights are to improve readability): Imperial College London K.Čyras and F. Toni
In essence, disregarding the other deductions, the self-<-attacking set {β, β ′ } deduces the contraries of both α and ε, and as β is less preferred than ε, the set {ε} <-attacks {β, β ′ } (via reverse attack), thus effectively <-defending {α}. Overall, (L, R, A,¯¯, ) has a unique <-complete extension S = {ε, α}, which is <-preferred, <-grounded and <-ideal (by Theorem 14).
In ABA (ignoring the preferences), the following arguments (named, for ease of reference) can be obtained: E : {ε} ⊢ ε; B : {β} ⊢ β; B ′ : {β ′ } ⊢ β ′ ; A : {α} ⊢ α; X ε : {β, β ′ } ⊢ ε;
AB ′ : {α, β ′ } ⊢ β; AB : {α, β} ⊢ β ′ . These arguments together with attacks among them instantiate an AA framework (Args, ), which can be depicted graphically as follows: 
A
Since the only preference information is β < ε, in the three resulting PAFs (employing ≺ Eli , ≺ Dem and ≺ DEli , respectively) it suffices to check only whether attacks on E succeed as defeats.
There is only one such attack, namely X ε E. We find X ε ≺ Eli E and X ε ≺ DEli E, while X ε ⊀ Dem E. Note that, even though with respect to the Elitist and Disjoint Elitist comparison principles the attack X ε E is reversed into the defeat E ֒→ X ε , the argument E still does not defend A in (Args, ֒→) (because X α A and neither E X α nor X α E), so that {E} is a unique complete extension of (Args, ֒→), and hence of (Args, , ). With respect to the Democratic comparison principle, X ε ֒→ E, so that E defends neither A nor itself, and thus ∅ is a unique complete extension of ((Args, ֒→) and) (Args, , ). In any event, we see that acceptable assumptions in ABA + do not correspond to acceptable arguments in PAFs.
To summarise, we showed that PAFs can be seen as instances of (flat) ABA + frameworks.
The converse is not true in the instantiations of PAFs by using standard ABA arguments and well known argument comparison principles, because for these instantiations not all attacks stemming from arguments with the same supporting sets of assumptions are reversed, whereas in ABA + attacks are reversed between sets of assumptions (supporting possibly multiple deductions).
Whether other instantiations of PAFs with ABA + are possible, is left for future work.
p ABA
Following [60] , a p ABA framework is a tuple (L, R, A,¯¯, ) with (L, R, A,¯¯) the underlying ABA framework and a (partial) preorder over L. 10 A preference relation (i.e. preorder)
⊑ over ABA extensions is defined (via [52]'s criterion for comparing answer sets in Logic
Programming with preferences) to select the 'preferable' extensions, called P-extensions, of (L, R, A,¯¯, ).
11 Formally, given a p ABA framework (L, R, A,¯¯, ), let E be the collection of σ extensions of (L, R, A,¯¯). A binary preference relation ⊑ over E can be defined as follows:
-there is ψ ∈ Cn(E) \ Cn(E ′ ) with ψ ϕ and -there is no χ ∈ Cn(E) \ Cn(E ′ ) with ϕ ≺ χ;
• E ⊑ E;
Observe that p ABA merely discriminates among extensions of the underlying ABA framework; thus, in Example 6, the unique σ extension {α} of the underlying ABA framework (L, R, A,¯¯) is a unique σ P-extension of the p ABA framework (L, R, A,¯¯, ), disregarding the preference α < β.
To see another considerable difference between ABA + and p ABA, let us consider odd cycles. These frequently prevent existence of, in particular, stable extensions, and may lead to empty grounded extensions. However, when preference information is present, it can break cycles. We illustrate with the following variant of the well known example of a '3-cycle'.
Example 14. Consider R = {β ← α, γ ← β, α ← γ} and A = {α, β, γ} with γ < β < α.
In ABA, ignoring the preferences, there is an odd cycle {α} {β} {γ} {α}, and so no stable extension exists, and ∅ is a unique complete (hence grounded, ideal and preferred) extension. Thus, in p ABA, no stable P-extensions exist either, and P-extensions under other semantics are empty. That is, preferences do not really play a role. In contrast, ABA + yields a unique <-σ extension {α}. The situation is illustrated graphically below. Example 15. Let R = {α ← δ, β ← α, γ ← β, δ ← γ, γ ← δ}, A = {α, β, γ, δ} and δ < α, γ < β. In ABA, ignoring the preferences, we obtain two stable (and also preferred) extensions, E = {α, γ} and E ′ = {β, δ}, and the grounded/ideal extension ∅. In p ABA, both E and E ′ are stable/preferred P-extensions, and ∅ is the grounded/ideal P-extension.
In contrast, E is a unique <-stable/preferred/ideal extension in ABA + , and it is in addition <-grounded. (The situation is illustrated graphically below.) Given that α is objected against only by δ, but due to the preference δ < α this objection is refuted, ABA + accepts α, which, arguably, is the correct outcome.
To summarise, in contrast to ABA + , p ABA accommodates preferences in order to discriminate among extensions of the underlying ABA framework, which may lead to preference information being ineffective and/or the outcomes unintuitive.
ASPIC
+ ASPIC + is an expressive argumentation formalism, encompassing many key elements of structured argumentation with preferences (such as strict and defeasible rules, general contrariness mapping, various forms of attack as well as preferences). It was shown by [49] that flat ABA frameworks can be seen as instances of ASPIC + frameworks (i.e. as a class of ASPIC + frameworks without preferences). In this section we will show that ABA + is distinct from ASPIC + in several respects. In order for ASPIC + frameworks to behave well (in the sense of satisfying various formal properties, such as the Fundamental Lemma or the rationality postulates of [21] ), various requirements have to be met. For instance, contraposition, as discussed in section 5, is used;
preferences also have to satisfy certain conditions. The main focus of this section is to exhibit an example which adheres to the standard requirements imposed on ASPIC + frameworks, but is treated differently in ABA + and ASPIC + . To this end, we first extend the mapping from ABA to ASPIC + (without preferences) provided in [49] to a mapping from ABA + to ASPIC + (with preferences). Details of ASPIC + sufficient for our purposes in this paper are
In what follows, unless specified otherwise, we assume as given a flat ABA + framework (L, R, A,¯¯, ) with a preorder and¯¯: A → L such that α = α c , where α c ∈ L \ A, for any α ∈ A.
Definition 7. The ASPIC + framework corresponding to a flat ABA
• L = L ∪ {¬s : s ∈ L \ A and s = α c for any α ∈ A}, where ¬s ∈ L;
• C : L → ℘(L) is such that:
-if s ∈ L \ A and s = α c for any α ∈ A, then C(s) = {¬s} and C(¬s) = {s};
• R s = {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m → ϕ 0 : ϕ 0 ← ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m ∈ R};
The 
is thus closed under contraposition (see Appendix B), and we obtain the following ASPIC + arguments (similar to those in Example 13, and with the same names, except for X −α and
The corresponding AA framework (Args, ) can be represented graphically as follows:
12 For any α ∈ A, α and α c are contradictories (i.e. −α is α c and −α c is α); and otherwise, s and ¬s are contradictories (i.e. −s is ¬s and −¬s is s). We need to use contradictories, because otherwise preferences do not play a role, in the sense that undermining attacks (see Appendix B) always succeed as defeats, whatever the preferences. For instance, if in Example 12 ¬α and ¬β were contraries, rather than contradictories, of the premises α and β, respectively, then the attack B [30, 35] ).
As in Example 13, since the only preference information is β < p ε, it suffices to check only whether attacks on E succeed as defeats. With respect to the Elitist comparison principle, we obtain X −ε ≺ Eli E, so that X −ε ֒→ Eli E, EB, EB ′ . Therefore, (Args, ֒→ Eli ) has a unique complete extension {E} (which is likewise preferred, ideal and grounded) with conclusions (somewhat abusing the notation) Conc({E}) = A∈{E} Conc(A) = {ε}. Note that with respect to the Disjoint Elitist comparison principle, we also obtain X −ε ≺ DEli E, whence (Args, ֒→ DEli ) has a unique complete/preferred/ideal/grounded extension {E} too. With respect to the Democratic comparison, X −ε Dem E because β ′ p ε, so that ֒→ Dem = , and so (Args, ֒→ Dem ) has a unique complete extension ∅ with Conc(∅) = ∅.
As seen in Example 13, (L, R, A,¯¯, ) has a unique <-complete/<-preferred/ <-ideal/<-grounded extension {ε, α}, and Cn({ε, α}) = {ε, α}. Therefore, under any of the three argument comparison principles, conclusions of the unique extension (under any semantics bar (<-)stable) of the ABA + framework and its corresponding ASPIC + framework are different. This happens due to attack reversal in ABA + , which allows {ε} to <-defend both itself and {α} against {β, β ′ }, because β < ε. By contrast, in ASPIC + , the two arguments X −ε and X −α have the same premises {β, β ′ }, but only X −ε attacks E, while X −α attacks A.
Hence, although X −ε E does not result into a defeat due to the preference β < p ε, the attack X −α A does result into a defeat. In particular, E cannot defend A against the argument X −α that has the same premises as the argument X −ε against which E defends itself.
To summarise, it is plain that ABA + differs conceptually from ASPIC + in that attacks in ABA + are reversed due to preference information, while in ASPIC + attacks are discarded Imperial College London K.Čyras and F. Toni ABA + instead. We showed that, as a consequence, even flat ABA + frameworks satisfying the Axiom of Contraposition can yield semantically different outcomes when mapped into ASPIC + frameworks (in a natural manner). This complements the results on the contrasting behaviour of the two formalisms: for instance, the desirable ability to unconditionally preserve conflicts in ABA + (Proposition 7) in contrast to the need to impose certain requirements (such as contraposition) in ASPIC + (cf. Example 12); also, Weak Contraposition suffices for the Fundamental Lemma 13 to hold in ABA + , whereas ASPIC + needs (full) contraposition, which is strictly stronger than Weak Contraposition. Whether any correspondence is possible under (<-)stable semantics, and whether other mappings from ABA + to ASPIC + would allow to establish a correspondence for some restricted class of frameworks, is a line of future research.
Dung's Normal Attack
[32] proposed a novel attack relation, called normal attack, for ASPIC + -type argumentation
formalisms. This notion of normal attack is presented in a simplified setting, where premises (i.e. K p ) are represented as defeasible rules with empty bodies, similar to e.g. [22] . In such a setting, we can attempt to map ABA + into ASPIC + as in section 7.3, but with the following change in Definition 7: instead of having premises as assumptions (K p = A), we have
• an ordering d on R d given by ⇒ α d ⇒ β iff α β, and
For our purposes, normal attack can be defined thus. 13 Let A, B be (ASPIC + ) arguments. omitted and instead represented as strict and defeasible rules, respectively. The new attack relation is based on the idea that while (standard) rebut in ASPIC + is allowed only on the conclusion of a defeasible rule, unrestricted rebut is allowed on the conclusion of any rule. A major feature of ASPIC − is that so far it works only with total preference orderings over defeasible rules, and if a partial ordering is used instead, as in ABA + , then the extensions under various semantics need not satisfy the rationality postulates of [21] or other desirable properties, as noted in [22] . (This can also be witnessed by analysing Example 17 using the unrestricted rebut.) It would nonetheless be interesting to investigate in the future the relation of ABA + and a generalisation of ASPIC − to deal with partial preference orderings.
Rich PAFs [6] further introduced the so-called Rich PAFs: tuples (Args, , , ), where (Args, , ) is a PAF and is a refinement relation-a preorder-over extensions of the repaired framework (Args, ֒→) corresponding to (Args, , ). Extensions of (Args, , , ) are -maximal extensions of (Args, ֒→). The authors claim that using suitable refinement relations allows to select the (intuitively) preferable extensions, by excluding other extensions as unacceptable. However, [40] argues that excluding, due to the preferences, some extensions is not a desirable solution, because semantics already provide acceptability conditions. Rather, ranking the extensions may be more appropriate. A discussion on this topic is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. We leave the investigation of how ABA + relates to Rich PAFs for future work.
Other Several other approaches to argumentation with preferences, e.g. DeLP [39] , an early version of preference-based argumentation frameworks [1] , Value-based Argumentation [12, 42] , and Deductive Argumentation [14] , use preferences to discard attacks from arguments less preferred than the attackees. Similar in spirit are Abstract Dialectical Frameworks [17] (where ABA + an attack may fail if the attacked argument has a supporting argument that is preferred over the attacker) as well as AA-based formalisms representing preferences as attacks on attacks (e.g. Extended Argumentation Frameworks [44] , Argumentation Frameworks with Recursive Attacks [8] ). For reasons similar to those advocated regarding the differences between ABA + and ASPIC + , those formalisms are different from ABA + (see also [24] ), but precise analysis of any correspondence is left for future research.
Concluding Remarks
We have presented ABA + , a structured argumentation formalism that conservatively extends Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) with preferences and incorporates a novel technique to reverse attacks due to preference information. One important aspect is that ABA + assumes preferences on the object level (i.e. over assumptions) and incorporates them directly into the definition of attack, rather than assuming preferences on the meta level (e.g. over arguments).
A further important aspect is that ABA + allows for preferences in generic ABA frameworks, as opposed to allowing for preferences only in flat ABA frameworks [15] , as in e.g. [43, 37, 55, 60] .
We have shown that ABA + satisfies various desirable properties regarding relationship among semantics (e.g. [15, 35] ), rationality postulates (e.g. [21] ) and preference handling (e.g. [6, 3, 19, 53] ). We plan to investigate further properties of ABA + , as in e.g. [32, 9, 11, 31] . Another important contribution of this paper is a new principle, Weak Contraposition, that relaxes the principle of contraposition used in e.g. ASPIC + [47] and [32] , while guaranteeing various additional desirable properties for ABA + . We plan to investigate which other properties Weak Contraposition guarantees for ABA + and whether Weak Contraposition can be further relaxed.
We have seen that ABA + generalises Preference-based Argumentation Frameworks (PAFs) [6] , improves upon Assumption-Based Argumentation Equipped with Preferences (p ABA) [60] and differs from the majority of formalisms of argumentation with preferences which discard attacks due to preference information (e.g. [1, 12, 42, 17, 14, 39, 22, 32] ), particularly ASPIC + [47] .
We aim to analyse more precise relationships of ABA + to the aforementioned as well as other formalisms of argumentation with preferences (e.g. [8, 22] ). In addition, since ABA admits as instances various non-monotonic reasoning formalisms [15] , it would be interesting to study the relationship of ABA + to those formalisms where they have been extended with preferences.
Other future work directions include: analysing complexity of reasoning problems in ABA + , akin to analysis for ABA in [28, 36] ; studying whether computational mechanisms of ABA's dispute derivations [35, 33, 58] can be adapted to ABA + ; relating ABA + to the version of ABA where sets of arguments are seen as graphs [23] ; developing tools for computing ABA + extensions; extending the analysis in [25] of non-monotonic inference properties for ABA to ABA + ABA + ; further investigating how ABA + relates to various preference handling principles for non-monotonic reasoning (e.g. [53, 16] ); studying whether and how dynamic preferences (see e.g. [50, 20] ) can be accommodated in ABA + .
Theorem 6.
(i) Let A 0 ⊆ A 1 ⊆ . . ., where A 0 = E, be an ⊆-increasing sequence of <-admissible supersets of E. Take its upper bound A = i 0 A i and note that it is <-admissible: if it were either not closed, not <-conflict-free, or did not <-defend itself, then some finite subset (since deductions are finite) A ′ ⊆ A would not be either closed or <-conflict-free, or would not <-defend itself. Now, by Zorn's Lemma, E has a ⊆-maximally <-admissible superset, i.e. a <-preferred extension containing E. (ii) E is by definition closed and <-conflict-free. Given that E < {β} for every β ∈ A \ E, it is clear that E < B for every closed B ⊆ A such that B < E. Hence, E is <-admissible. Moreover, E is ⊆-maximally <-admissible, because E ∪ {β} < E ∪ {β} for any β ∈ A \ E. Thus, E is <-preferred, as required.
(iii) By (ii) above, E is <-admissible. Suppose for a contradiction that E <-defends A ⊆ A but A E. Then α ∈ E for some α ∈ A. Hence, E < {α}, and so E < A, due to stability. As E <-defends A, we find E < E, which is a contradiction. Thus, by contradiction, E contains every assumption set it <-defends, and so is <-complete. (iv) By definition, E is contained in every <-complete extension. By (iii) above, every <-stable extension is <-complete. Hence, E is contained in every <-stable extension. (v) E is ⊆-maximal set of assumptions contained in every <-preferred extension. Given that E is also <-admissible, it is by definition <-ideal. (vi) Suppose for a contradiction that B ⊆ A is <-admissible and B < E. By (i) above, there is a <-preferred extension A such that B ⊆ A. Then, as E is <-ideal, we have E ⊆ A, and hence A < A, which is a contradiction. (vii) ∅, being closed, is <-admissible. Hence, by (i) above, there is a <-preferred extension.
Thus, the intersection of <-preferred extensions exists, and so it has a ⊆-maximally <-admissible subset, i.e. an <-ideal extension.
Proposition 9. Let the preference ordering of (L, R, A,¯¯, ) be total and suppose M = {α ∈ A : ∄β ∈ A with α < β} is closed and <-conflict-free. We first show that M is not <-attacked.
To begin with, observe that M cannot be <-attacked via reverse attack, because its elements are <-maximal in A. So fix α ∈ M and suppose for a contradiction that for some B ⊆ A it holds that B ⊢ R α for some R ⊆ R and ∀β ∈ B α β or β α. Since is total, it follows that α β ∀β ∈ B. But as α is -maximal, it must also hold that β α, for any β ∈ B. From here, we show that B ⊆ M. Indeed, fix β ∈ B and assume for a contradiction that β ∈ M. Then ∃γ ∈ A such that β < γ. By transitivity of , we find α < γ, contradicting α's -maximality. So we must have β ∈ M, and consequently, B ⊆ M. But now, since α ∈ M, B ⊆ M and B < {α}, this contradicts <-conflict-freeness of M. Therefore, by contradiction,
If (L, R, A,¯¯, ) admits no <-complete extensions, then the principle is fulfilled trivially. Otherwise, let E be a <-complete extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ) and suppose for a contradiction that M E. Then E does not <-defend M. This means that S < M for some S ⊆ A, which is a contradiction. Hence, by contradiction, M ⊆ E. Thus, (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-complete semantics.
Since by Theorem 6(iii) <-stable extensions are <-complete, (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-stable semantics too.
Finally, for the <-well-founded semantics, recall that, by definition, the <-well-founded extension is the intersection of all the <-complete extensions. It follows that (L, R, A,¯¯, ) fulfils the Principle of Maximal Elements for <-well-founded semantics too.
Lemma 13 (Fundamental Lemma). We first prove that S ∪ {α} is <-admissible. If α ∈ S, then S ∪ {α} is trivially <-admissible. If α ∈ S, we first show by contradiction that S ∪ {α} is <-conflict-free, and then that S ∪ {α} <-defends itself.
Suppose first that S ∪ {α} is not <-conflict-free. Then S ∪ {α} < S ∪ {α} via either (1) normal or (2) reverse attack. We show that either leads to S < S ′ ∪ {α} for some S ′ ⊆ S, and then that this leads to a contradiction. 1. Suppose S ∪ {α} < S ∪ {α} via normal attack. Note that as S is <-conflict-free and <-defends {α}, the <-attack S ∪ {α} < S ∪ {α} must involve α. That is, S ′ ∪ {α} ⊢ R β for some S ′ ⊆ S and β ∈ S ∪ {α}, and ∀s ′ ∈ S ′ ∪ {α} we find s ′ < β. If β = α, then S ′ ∪ {α} < {α}, and so S < S ′ ∪ {α}. Else, if β ∈ S ′ , then S ′ ∪ {α} < S, and so S < S ′ ∪ {α} too.
2. Suppose S ∪ {α} < S ∪ {α} via reverse attack. As in 1., this <-attack must involve α, i.e. S ′ ∪ {α} ⊢ R β for some S ′ ⊆ S and β ∈ S ∪ {α}, and ∃s ′ ∈ S ′ ∪ {α} such that s ′ < β.
(by asymmetry of <), and using the Axiom of Weak Contraposition (WCP henceforth) we find
Then, by Lemma 4, either
In either case (1) or (2), we obtained S < S ′ ∪ {α}, and as S is <-conflict-free and <-defends {α}, this <-attack must be reverse and involve α: namely, there is A 1 ∪ {α} ⊢ R 1 s 1 with s 1 ∈ S, A 1 ⊆ S ′ , and ∃s 
As deductions are finite and < is asymmetric, the procedure described above will eventually exhaust pairs of s ′ k ∈ A k and s k ∈ S k such that s ′ k < s k , so that S < S k ∪ {α} will have to be a normal attack, for some S k . This leads to a contradiction to S being <-admissible and <-defending {α}.
Hence, by contradiction, S ∪ {α} is <-conflict-free.
We now want to show that S ∪ {α} <-defends itself. So let B < S ∪ {α}. As S is <-admissible and <-defends {α}, we consider this <-attack to be reverse and involving α:
and there is -minimal s ′ ∈ S ′ ∪ {α} with s ′ < β 1 . Then, by WCP, there is
Due to <-conflict-freeness of S ∪ {α}, it holds that β 1 ∈ S 1 . Also, due to -minimality of s ′ and because s ′ < β 1 , we find that ∄x ∈ S 1 with x < s ′ . Thus, S 1 < {s ′ } via normal attack. Since S is <-admissible and <-defends {α}, we must have S < S 1 , and hence S ∪ {α} < S 1 . This <-attack cannot be normal on (S ′ ∪ {α}) \ {s ′ }, due to <-conflict-freeness of S ∪ {α}; while, if it is normal on β 1 , then S ∪ {α} < B, as required. Else, S ∪ {α} < S 1 via reverse attack: there is
with s 1 ∈ S ∪{α}, B 1 ⊆ S 1 , and ∃s
Due to <-conflict-freeness of S ∪ {α}, we find β 1 ∈ B 1 . Then again, by WCP, we find
and β 1 ∈ S 2 . Like with the proof of <-conflict-freeness, this process must terminate with a normal attack S ∪ {α} < B, so that S ∪ {α} eventually <-defends itself.
Finally, we need to show that S ∪ {α} <-defends {α ′ }. Given that S <-defends {α ′ } to begin with, and that < is monotonic (Lemma 3), we conclude that S ∪ {α} <-defends {α ′ } too.
Theorem 14. Proof of each claim follows the pattern of the corresponding proofs in e.g. [30, 15, 35, 8] .
(i) In flat ABA + frameworks all sets of assumptions are closed, and, in particular, ∅ is closed. Hence, ∅ is <-admissible, and so according to Theorem 6(vii), F has a <-preferred extension.
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(ii) Let E be a <-preferred extension of F and suppose for a contradiction that it is not <-complete. Let E <-defend some {α} ⊆ A \ E. As E is <-admissible, E ∪ {α} is <-admissible, by Lemma 13. But then E is not ⊆-maximally <-admissible, contrary to E being <-preferred. Hence, by contradiction, E must be <-complete. (iii) Follows from (i) and (ii) above. Def(A) ⊆ Def(B). As (℘(A), ⊆) is a complete lattice, fixed points of Def also form a complete lattice, according to Knaster-Tarski Theorem [54] . As Def is compact (as deductions are finite), it has a unique least fixed point G, given by G = i∈N Def i (∅).
As ∅ is <-admissible, G is also <-admissible, by Lemma 13. Hence, G is <-complete (as G = Def(G)), and unique ⊆-minimal such (as the least fixed point). Therefore, G is a unique <-grounded extension of F , and is <-complete, as required. (v) From (i) above, we know that F admits <-preferred extensions, so let S be their intersection. If S = ∅, then it is <-admissible, and so an <-ideal extension (unique). If S = ∅ is <-admissible, then it is an <-ideal extension (unique as well). Else, assume S = ∅ is not <-admissible. Then its ⊆-maximally <-admissible subsets I S are <-ideal extensions of F . Suppose I and I ′ are two distinct <-admissible subsets of S. Then their union I ∪ I ′ is a subset of S too, and so <-conflict-free. By Lemma 13, I ∪ I ′ <-defends itself, so must be <-admissible. Consequently, there can be only one ⊆-maximally <-admissible subset of S, i.e. a unique <-ideal extension I of F . Now, suppose for a contradiction that I is not <-complete. Then some {α} ⊆ A \ I is <-defended by I. Such α must be contained in the intersection S of <-preferred extensions of F , because I ⊆ S <-defends {α} and every <-preferred extension F is <-complete, by (ii) above. But then, I ∪ {α} is <-admissible, according to Lemma 13 , so that I is not <-ideal-a contradiction. Therefore, I must be <-complete.
Theorem 17. Suppose first that E ⊆ Args is a σ extension of (Args, , ). As E is conflict-free in (Args, ֒→), it is <-conflict-free in (L, R, A,¯¯, ), by Lemma 16. Similarly, using Lemma 16 and construction of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), it is plain to see that E <-defends itself. So E is <-admissible. It now suffices to prove additional properties as required for each semantics σ. We do this case by case. σ = complete. If E <-defends A ⊆ A, then, by construction of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), E <-defends every A ∈ A, whence E defends every A ∈ A in (Args, ֒→). As E is complete, we find
A ⊆ E, whence E is <-complete. σ = preferred. If E were not ⊆-maximally <-admissible, it would <-defend some A ∈ A \ E (as for σ = complete above), whence E would defend A in (Args, ֒→), and would not be preferred. Hence, E must be <-preferred. σ = stable. If E < {B} for some B ∈ A \ E, then E ֒→ B, by Lemma 16, so that E would not be stable, if E were not <-stable. σ = ideal. As E is contained in every preferred extension P of (Args, , ), and since preferred extensions of (Args, , ) are in one-to-one correspondence with the <-preferred extensions of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), as per proofs for σ = preferred above and below, we conclude that E is contained in every <-preferred extension P of (L, R, A,¯¯, ). Clearly, E must be ⊆-maximal such, as otherwise E would not be ideal in (Args, , ). σ = grounded. E is ⊆-minimally complete in (Args, ֒→) [30] , and so in (Args, , ). Thus, E is <-complete as above, and due to ⊆-minimality, it is the intersection of all <-complete extensions of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), so <-grounded.
Suppose now that E ⊆ A is a <-σ extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ). That E is admissible in (Args, , ) follows from the construction of (L, R, A,¯¯, ) and Lemma 16. For any σ ∈ {grounded, ideal, stable, preferred, complete}, a mirror argument as for σ above applies here, in the case of σ = grounded noting that, by construction of (L, R, A,¯¯, ), the <-grounded extension of (L, R, A,¯¯, ) exists, is unique and <-complete.
Appendix B. ASPIC + For our purposes in this paper, a simplified exposition of ASPIC + , as follows, will suffice. (The reader is referred to [47, 49, 46] for details.)
An ASPIC + framework is a tuple (L, C, R s ,
, where:
• L is a language;
• C : L → ℘(L) is a contrariness function such that:
-ϕ is a contrary of ψ just in case ϕ ∈ C(ψ) and ψ ∈ C(ϕ); -ϕ is a contradictory of ψ, denoted ϕ = −ψ, just in case ϕ ∈ C(ψ) and ψ ∈ C(ϕ);
-every ϕ ∈ L has at least one contradictory; • R s is a set of strict rules of the form ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n → ϕ, where ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ϕ ∈ L;
• R d is a set of defeasible rules of the form ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ⇒ ϕ, where ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n , ϕ ∈ L; • R s ∩ R d = ∅; • d is a transitive binary relation on R d ;
• n : R d → L is a naming function for defeasible rules; • K n ⊆ L is a set of axioms;
• K p ⊆ L is a set of premises; • K n ∩ K p = ∅; • p is a transitive binary relation on K p .
Whenever a component of an ASPIC
+ framework is empty, we may omit it. In particular, as we will use neither the naming function n for defeasible rules nor the axioms K n , these components are henceforth omitted. In the remainder of this section, we assume as given a fixed but otherwise arbitrary ASPIC + framework (L, C, R s ,
Arguments in ASPIC + are defined as follows. An argument A is any of the following:
• [ϕ] iff ϕ ∈ K p . It has:
-premises Prem(A) = {ϕ}; -conclusion Conc(A) = ϕ; -sub-arguments Sub(A) = {A}; Other requirements on ASPIC + frameworks will be met automatically in our setting, so we omit to specify them here. Attacks in ASPIC + are defined as follows. 15 Let A, B ∈ Args. We say that A attacks B (on B ′ ), written A B, iff for some B ′ ∈ Sub(B) such that B ′ = [ϕ] and ϕ ∈ K p , Conc(A) = −ϕ (i.e. Conc(A) ∈ C(ϕ) and ϕ ∈ C(Conc(A))). Arguments can be compared using the given preference ordering p over premises K p , as follows. Consider A, B ∈ Args with A = Prem(A) ∩ K p and B = Prem(B) ∩ K p .
• A ≺ Eli B if ∃α ∈ A such that ∀β ∈ B we find α < p β;
• A ≺ DEli B if ∃α ∈ A \ B such that ∀β ∈ B \ A we find α < p β;
• A Dem B if ∀α ∈ A we find β ∈ B with α p β; 15 When mapping ABA + frameworks into ASPIC + , due to absence of defeasible rules, only undermining attacks will result, so we omit to specify the other types of attacks. , ֒→) , where ֒→ is the defeat relation generated by and ≺. Extensions of F (under various semantics σ) are defined as σ extensions of (Args, ֒→) (see section 2).
